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This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the theory of what Bhagwati (1982) has 
christened the theory of DUP activities. These are activities that use up real resources in making 
profits (i.e. income) without producing directly or indirectly a ‘good’. They result therefore in the 
contraction of the availability set defined on goods. For one generic subset of such DlJP 
activities, namely distortion-triggered lobbying activities, the paper establishes asymmetrical 
propositions on the possibility of such DUP lobbying resulting in a paradoxical improvement of 
welfare. 
1. Introduction: Concepts and questions 
In the last decade a numkx of economists have turned to analyzing 
esoteric activities uch as illegal transactions (e.g. smuggling or tariff evasion), 
lobbying for licenses, lobbying for tariffs or monopoly, etc. none of which is 
part of the economist’s standard tool kit. 
It has recently been argued [Bhagwati (198211 that the key characteristic 
of these activities is that they represent, unlike the ‘normal’ or ‘traditional’ 
activities of economic models, ways of making profits that do not involve 
directly the production of any output. In short, they are directly-unproductive, 
profit-seeking (hereafter DUP) activities, and their effect is to contract the 
available set of consumption possibilities in the economy by diverting 
resources from directly-productive activities. ’ 
*Thanks are due to the Guggenheim Foundation and the National Science Foundation for 
financial support of the first author’s research. The comments cf Richard Brecher, Alasdair 
Smith and Michael Roemer are gratefully acknowledged. 
‘Pronounced as ‘dupe’ activities, the phrase DUP activities also comes close to the spirit in 
which economists are likely to view such activities! The alternative of diing them ZOP (i.e. 
zero-output pro&seeking) activities is, on that ground, less appealing. Strictly speaking, these 
activities provide income to factors employed in them. As such, ‘income-seeking’ rather than 
‘profit-seeking’ is a more appropriate way of characterizing them. However, given the aptness of 
the word ‘dupe’ in describing them, we have chosen to retain the phrase ‘profit-seeking’. 
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When these DUP activities are policy-intervention-related in the economy 
- and they need not be, as in the case of theft, noted by Tullock (1967) - 
they can be classified to analytical advantage, as shown in fig. 1. There, the 
DUP activities are classified into two basic categories: I, those that seek 
policy intervention (including change therein) as in the case of protectionist 
lobbying to create tariffs or quotas; and II, those that are triggered by 
(exogenous) policy intervention. The intervention-triggered DUP activities 
are, in turn, classifiable into lobbying activities to secure a share in the 
resulting rents or revenues, and the intervention-euading DUP activities uch 
as smuggling in the presence of tariffs or QRs. Each of the resulting three 
major classes of DUP activities, in turn, can relate to quantitative or price 
interventions. 
This paper addresses the DUP activities of the lobbying class, and 
essentially contrasts the quantity and price distortion-triggered DUP 
lobbying on the dimension of their welfare impact. One precise point, 
considered in section 2, is the following. When the policy intervention that 
triggers such lobbying is distortionary (e.g. the quotas that are lobbied for 
happen to result in a suboptimal restriction of trtrde rather than constituting 
optimal restriction), we know from earlier analyses [e.g. Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1980)-J that the diversion of resources into DUP lobbying has to 
be considered in a sec:ond-best context. As such, it is possible to argue that 
distortion-triggered lobbying may be paradoxically welfare-improving: 
reflecting the phenomenon of immiserizing rowth [e.g. Bhagwati (1958) and 
Johnson (1967fl or, its dual, the phenomenon of negative shadow factor 
prices that can arise in a distortionary situation [Srinivasan and Bhagwati 
(1978)-J. Section 2 considers whether such a paradox can arise symmetrically 
in the case of both quantity and price distortions, Le. equally in the two 
cases, 3 and 4, distinguished in fig. 1. Section 2 derives two central 
propositions in this regard, which establish a basic asymmetry in regard to 
.the paradoxical welfare-impact possibilities in the presence of quantity- 
intervention-triggered and price-intervention-triggered DUP lobbying 
activities. Section 3 extends the contrast between these two types of DUP 
lobbying activities to yet other questions which have important theoretical 
and policy implications. 
2. Price versus quantity distortion-triggered DUP lobbying and welfare 
improvement 
We show that:2 
Proposition 1. Whenever the distortion that tri.zgers DUP lobbying actioity is 
the only (distortion in the economy, and is a ,‘@ure) quantity constraint and 
‘These propositions are based upon there being just on6 distortion in the economy and need 
not hold when there is more than one distortion. For instance, if there are several foreign 
distortions, proposition 1 need not hold unless each distortion happens to be a quota. Alasdair 
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remains a binding constraint in the presence of the DUP lobbying activity, 
there can be no welfare improvement. 
Proposition 2. When the ocly distortion is instead an ad valorem price 
distortion, DUP lobbying can raise we&&e (except when the distortion does not 
a$ect productive ficiency). 
The essential argument underlying proposition 1’ is that, while the DUP 
lobbying activity takes place in a second-best distortionary situation, it fails 
to improve welfare because the quantity constraint ‘bottles up’ the source of 
positive gain that might outweigh the loss implied by the diversion of real 
resources to the DUP activity. This, on the other hand, does not happen 
when the distortion is instead of a price variety. 
To see this in the traditional 2 x 2, small, open economy model, consider 
then the four classic distortionary cases,3 in their quantity and price versions: 
(1) trade quota/constraint and trade tariff; (2) production quota/constraint 
and production tax; (3) factor use quota/constraint and factor tax; and (4) 
consumption quota/constraint and consumpticn tax. 
2.1. Trade quota and trade tariff 
A quota carries a premium which leads to ‘premium-seeking’ by lobbyists 
hoping to gel’. hold of the trade quota. The price counterpart of this, of 
course, is the revenue that the tariff yiekds; and the corresponding DUP 
lobbying is then ‘revenue-seeking’. Geometrically, it is easy to show how 
revenue-seeking may lead to paradoxical welfare-improvement, whereas 
premium-seeking cannot. 
2.1.1. 7+&e tariff 
Thus, imagine a tariff-seeking lobby has succeeded and a protective tariff 
has been put in place. Imagine next that the revenue that results from this 
(nonprohibitive) tariff attracts a revenue-seeking lobby. This revenue-seeking 
lobby therefore operates from an initially-distorted, tariff-ridden equilibrium 
(see fig. 2). There a small country with given terms of trade P,C, and a 
production possibility curve AB is depicted. Then a tariff is imposed, making 
the importable good 2 more expensive domestically and leading to 
production at P, at the point of tangency of the tariff-inclusive price-ratio 
P,S with AB, and consumption at C,. Now, a DUP revenue-seeking activity 
which this tariff generates would lead to production of goods shifting from P, 
?hese four cases have been distinguished and “analyzed, from the viewpoint of the theory of 
policy intervention in the presence of noneconclmic obj*xt.ives, in Bhagwati anJ Srinivasan 
(1969). 
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INCOME-CC rSUMPTlON CURVE 
(for goods price- ratio C t S) 
Fig. 2. 
to somewhere inside AB and, if this shift occurred to a point such as PD in 
the striped zone, the revenue-seeking activity would paradoxically improve 
welfare: as at CF. 
2.1.2. Bade quota 
Now, does this paradoxical possibility not arise equally if the tariff is 
replaced instead by an import quota? It would seem at first blush that it 
would. But this is not 50.~ For, in the case of a quota on exports or imports, 
when defined purely in quantity (rather than value) terms, the trade triangle 
is fixed for the binding quota as C,O, P, and, no matter where P, shifts to 
within AB as a result of premium-seeking, the attendant constrained-trade 
equilibrium must imply that the resulting consumption point C,” cannot rise 
above C,S and hence above U, as well. As long as imports are fixed 
quantitatively, therefore, premium-seeking has to be immisetizing. 
‘Bhagwati and Sninivasan (1980) were in error on this issue and Mehmood-ul Anam 0’4 
Carleton Univetrity spotted this. 
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2.2. Production quota and production tax 
Next, consider fig. 3 for the case of production distortions. Assume that 
the initial equilibrium production is distorted to P, but consumption takes 
place at international prices at C,. 
Fig: 3. 
2.2.1. Production quota 
Now, if the distortion is a quantitative me, i.e. Xz =:X2, the DUP activity 
generated to get the lucrative premia on production licenses (for producing 
good 2) will necessarily immiserize the economy. The reason is clearly that 
the loss of resources to the DUP activity will only shift the social budget line 
inwards and, given X,, this must reduce X1 and hence social utility. In fig. 3, 
the shift of production is shown, under the quota, to P, from the initial P,,. 
2.2.2. Production tax 
However, ii the distortion is of a price variety, i.e. a production tax, brings 
production initially to tB,,8, DUP activity will raise welfare if it shifts the 
production point to within the striped area. 
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2.3. Factor employment quota and factor ta?, 
Here again, a factor employment quantity constraint will eliminate the 
possibility of a negative shadow factor price, whereas a factor tax distortion 
will not. 
2.3.1. Factor employment quota 
With an employment quota of say L1, in the absence of DUP activity the 
transformation curve of the economy will be inside the curve without the 
quota (except at one point). The initial equilibrium will be characterized by 
the tangency of the international price hne with this restricted transformation 
curve. As such the introduction of DUP activities will only shift the 
availability line inwards, as in the productiors quota case, thus resulting in a 
loss of welfare. 
2.3.2. Factor tax 
Suppose the employment level is implemented instead through a tax on 
employment in the production of good 2. With no DUP lobbying, but with 
the tax kept constant at this rate, the restricted transformation curve is AB in 
fig. 4 (though AB need not be concave as drawn, of course). At the initial 
position F*,C*, tangency of the price line with the transformation curve no 
longer obtains. Hence, introducing DUP can improve welfare if it shifts the 
production point from P* to somewhere in the shaded area. 
2.4. Consumption quota and consumption tax 
Finally, we consider the consumption quota and tax cases and 
demonstrate that, in both cases, the paradox of negative shadow prices will 
not arise, despite the second-best nature of the problem at hand. 
2.4.1. Consumption constraint 
Let the initial sit.uation be at P*, CEI and U,, in fig. 5. Interpreting this as a 
consumption quantity constraint, such that C2 s C2, we can see that seeking 
will necessarily shift the social budget line to the left (i.e. from P*C, to C,C,) 
and hence immiserize the economy (shifting it from Ll, to U,). 
2.4.2. Consumption tax 
In this instance, however, even if the initial situation is treated as a 
consumption tax distortion, there will be a shift in welfare from U,, to CJ, as 
consumption shifts from C,, to C, down the i~:come-consulmption curve at 
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Rmtrictad Production 
Pomibiliiy Curve, given 
Fig. 4. 
Fig. 5. 
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constant (consumer) goods price-ratio d. Thus, in the case of a consumption 
distortion, there can be no welfare impro* >ment even with a price distortion! 
The reason why, in both the price and quantity cases, we now have 
immiserization is easily understood. Since the initial situation represents full 
production efficiency (at P*), tiny lobbying must necessarily shift the social 
budget line inwards. For the fixed price distortion in consumption, by writing 
the indirect utility function in termc of the domestic goods price ratio p and 
the world-price-valued social income y, we see immediately that the former p 
is fixed and the latter y declines with DUP lobbying. Hence, a decline in 
social utility is ,inevit;tble. For the quantity distortion, again the decline in 
social income y im p!ics that, given Ca, the attainable C1 must fall, and hence 
zgzls j dczline i.n social utility follows. 
2.5. General principles 
In all these cases the quantity distortion does not permit welfare 
improvement. Why? The answer is clear as soon as one understands that for 
welfare improvement through DUP lobbying to occur, the shadow price of a 
factor has to be negative. However, the marginal variation in factor supply is 
in each such quantity-constrained case undertaken from what can be 
regarded as a second-best optimal position; and, as Bhagwati’s (1968) 
generalization of the theory of immiserizing growth shows, immiserizing 
growth and hence its mirror image phenomenon of a negative shadow factor 
price [see Bhagwati, Srinivasan and Wan (1978)] can arise only if 
,,;uboptimality is present. The reason why the quantity-constrained cases ,can 
-be regarded as involving marginal variation of factor supply from an optimal 
position is that, as we know from the theory of optimal policy intervention 
in the case of noneconomic objectives [Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969j], the 
optimal way to achieve quantity constraints or objectives relating to 
production, consumption, trade and factor employment is to utilize implicit 
or explicit tax-cum-subsidies on production, consumption, trade and factor 
use, respectively. In fact, utilizing this very insight, Bhagwati (1970, pp. 82- 
84) had argued that the phenomenon of immiserizing rowth could not arise 
when noneconomic objectives were being pursued with the aid of first-best 
policies,5 but that it would resurrect itself if second-best or third-best 
policies were adopted to implement hem in the first place. Proposition 1 
above therefore follows immediately. 
50ur unpublished algebraic derivation of shadow factor prices in the quota-constrained cases 
(concerning trade, production, factor use and consumption)1 shows correspondingly that the 
shadow factor prices in these cases are the market prices. This precise proposition is referred to 
in subsection 3.2 below. It is, of course, to be expected that the shadow prices would be the 
market prices when, as argued in the text, the qu.antity-constrained cases can be construed as 
involving a second-best opt+wl situation. 
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At the same time, it is equally clear that if the initial situation is regarded 
as one of price distortion, it cannot now bc interpreted as one characterized 
by second-best optimality. Therefore, the possibility of a welfare 
improvement cannot be ruled out (except for the case of a consumption 
distortion since productive efficiency obtains in this case even under the 
distortion in consumption). Hence proposition 2 follows. 
3. Other theoretical implications 
3.1. Rank-ordering DUP lobbying activities triggered by quantity and price 
distortions 
It is important to note that, while DUP lobbying is necessarily wasteful 
when triggered by price distortions but not generally when triggered by 
quantity distortions (as just demonstrated in section 2), this does not imply 
that one can uniquely rank-order these distortions in the presence of DUP 
activity. This point was raised by Krueger (1974) in her analysis of premium- 
seeking, and the attendant analysis of tariffs versus quotas. Hence, we may 
take up that comparison, but allowing for full revenue-seeking and premium- 
seeking to arise in the tariff and quota cases, respectively. 
Thus, take fig. 2 again and consider two possibilities. First, let the 
equilibrium at Pt, without the DUP activity, be a tariff equilibrium and let it 
trigger a revenue-seeking DUP activity which is, for simplicity, ji&y 
competitive and results :in all revenues being sought. Next, consider P1 to be 
a quota equilibrium and again allow it to trigger a premium-seeking DUP 
activity which is fully competitive and result;; in all premia on the import 
licenses being sought. Comparing now the two outcomes, we must conciude 
that it is not possible to rank-order the two outcomes, even if the technology 
of the revenue-seeking and premium-seeking DUP activities is assumed to be 
identical. This, and more, can be shown as follows. 
At the full seeking equilibrium, consumer expenditure equals fa.ctor 
incomes that correspond to the production point on the production 
possibility curve at which the marginal rate of transformation equal; the 
domestic price ratio. Hence, denoting by p this domestic price ratio id by 
Y(p) the total factor income given p, we can write welfare in terms of the 
indirect utility function V(p, Y(p)). From the fact that p equals the marginal 
rate of transformation, we get dY/dp = X, ‘~ooutput of good 2. Hence, dV/dp 
=aV/~?p+(8V/aY). X,. Now, from Roy’s identity, we know that (W/aY)C, 
= -aV/ap, where lCZ is fir,:: consumption of good 2. Thus, dV/dp= 
-(aV/aY)(C, --X,)*=0, given that aV/aY >O and good 2 is the importable. 
Hence, if the domestic price-ratio corresponding to the equilibrium with a 
quota and full premium-seeking is greater (smaller-) than the tariff-inclusive 
price, welfare in that equilibrium will be lower (I igher) than that under a 
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tariff with full revenue-seeking. In other 1 .ords, the comparison of welfare 
levels will reflect a comparison of the impiicit tariff under the quota (and full 
premium-seeking) with the explicit tariff! 
3.2. Shadow factor prices in the presence. of DUP lobbying 
Yet another interesting issue is what the presence of DUP lobbying does 
to the estimation of shadow factor prices in cost-benefit analysis: a question 
raised recently by Foster (1981). Now, we know already from subsection 2.5 
(and the unpublished algebraic analysis referred to in footnote 5, which 
corroborates the analysis of subsection 2.5), that the shadow price of each 
factor at the initial equilibrium, when such equilibrium is characterized by 
the absence of DUP lobbying, is its market price when this distortion is a 
quantity distortion (but not when it is a price distortion). However, we can 
show, following on from Foster’s (1981) interesting analysis, that the shadow 
factor price will generally be the market price if the initial situation is itself 
defined to be DUP-lobbying-inclusioe, when the distortion is a price 
distortion rather than a quantity distortion! In short, the equivalence of 
shadow and market factor prices occurs in exactly opposite cases, in regard 
to quantity and price distortions, depending on whether the initial situation 
is DUP-lobbying-exclusive or DUP-lobbying-inclusive. Why? 
To see this, consider again the revenue-seeking and premium-seeking 
comparison. In the former case, with the entire revenue sought away, the 
consumer expenditure on goods equals income at market prices for factors. 
And these factor prices and goods prices do not change (as long as 
incomplete specialization continues) as we vary factor endowments, thanks to 
the tariff. As such, the value of change in the labour (capital) endowment by 
a unit is its market reward: hence, the shadow factor prices are the market 
prices. Asymmetrically, this proposition does not extend generally to shadow 
prices of factors at the premium-seeking equilibrium in the case of a quota. 
For, generally, the implicit tariff and hence factor prices will vary with 
marginal variation in the factor supply, in this instance. 
References 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1958, Immiserizing growth: A geometrical note, Review of Economic 
Studies 25, June, 201-205. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1968, Distortions and immiserizing growth: A generalization, Review of 
Economic Studies 35, October, 481-485. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1970, The generalized theory of distortions and welfare, in: 1. Bhagwati, 
R.W. Jones, R. Mundell and J. Vanek, eds., Trade balance of payments and growth: Essays 
in honor of Charles P. Kindleberger (North-Holland, Amsterdam). 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1982, Directly-unproductive, profit-seeking activities: .“\ welfare-theoretic 
synthesis and generalizati,on, Journal of Political Economy 90, October. 
44 J.N. Mragwari und ‘EN. SriniwJcrrm, DV P lobbying activities 
Bhagwati, Jagdish. N. and Bent I Hansen, 1973, A theoretical analysis of smuggling, Quarterly 
Journal of Econotnics 87, May. 
Bhagwati Jagdish, N. arid T.N, Srinivasan. 1969, Optimal interventton to achieve non-economic 
c)bJcctivcs, Review OS Economic Studies, January. 
Bbgwati? Jagdish, N, and T.K. Srinivasan, 1980, Revenue-seeking: A generalization of the 
theory of ~.arilfs, Journal of Political Economy 88, December. 
Bhagwati, Jadieh N,, ‘TM Sr@ivasan and Henry Wan Jr., 1978, Value subtract#l, negative 
shadow prices of ftiors in project evah.ation, and immiaerizing growth: Three paradoxes in 
the presence of trade diatorticns, Economic Journal 88, Mar& 121-125. 
Falvey. Rodney, 1978, A nore on preferential and illegal trade under quantitative restrictions, 
Quarterly Journal ef Economics 92. 
Findlay, Ronald and Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982, Ecdogenous tari& the political economy of trade 
restrictions and welfare, in: J. Bhagwati, cd., Import competition and response, N.B.E.R. 
(University of Chirztgo Press). 
Foster. Edward, 1981. The tmtment of rents in cost-benefit analysis, American Economic 
Review 71. March, 171-178. 
Johnson, Harry G., 1967, The possibility of income losses from increased efficiency or factor 
accumulation in the presence of tariffs, Economic Journal, March. 
Johnson, Harry CL, 1974, ‘Notes on the economic theory of smuggling.’ Malayan Economic 
Review, May 1972; mprinted LII: J. Bhqwati, ed, Ulega! ;ransactions in international trade, 
Series in International Economics (North-HoBand, Amsterdam). 
Krueger, Anne Osborne, 1974, The political economy of the rent-seeking society, American 
Economic Review 64, June, 
Pitt, Mark, 1981, Smuggling and price disparity, Joumvl of International Economics, November. 
Shdkh. Munir, 1974, Smuggling, production and welkre. Journal ?f international Economics 4, 
November, 
Srinivasan, TN. and Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1978. Shadow factar prices for project selection in the 
presence of distortions: Effective ratea of protection and domestic resource costs, Journal of 
Political Economy 84( I ). 
Tullock. Gordon, lW7, The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies and theft, Western Economic 
Journal 5, 
